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In Focus

Challenging Prevailing Models
of US Army Suicide
Tim Hoyt and Pamela M. Holtz
ABSTRACT: Statistics behind reported suicide rates in the military
are often insufficiently analyzed and portray a distorted picture of
reality. Several models for identifying individuals at risk for suicide
have been proposed but few show adequate predictive power to be
actionable. Instead, a collaborative and consistent effort to address
core drivers at the individual level may be more useful.

S

ince the drawdown of combat action in Iraq and Afghanistan,
suicide and self-inflicted injury account for more deaths annually
across the armed forces than all other factors except accidents.1
Accordingly, suicide prevention has been a strategic priority for more
than a decade. The 2015 National Military Strategy emphasized suicide
prevention as a core aspect of ethical leadership requiring a culture of
trust and mutual respect.2 Despite the sustained emphasis on prevention,
however, the rate of suicide in the US Army remains largely unchanged.3
This article highlights several key findings in the scientific literature
in an effort to dispel myths regarding suicide rates in the US Army.
It thereby provides a touch point for military leaders as they prioritize
prevention initiatives and programs. Specifically, six questions
are addressed:
1. What is the current trend in suicide death rates?
2. How do US Army suicide rates compare to civilian rates?
3. Can predictive models be used to predict suicide deaths?
4. What risk factors can leaders influence?
5. Have prevention programs been effective?
6. What is an appropriate target for suicide reduction?

Current Trends

Recent publications erroneously describe current trends of suicide
among servicemembers as “steadily rising.”4 Popular media similarly

1. Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, “Surveillance Snapshot: Manner and Cause of
Death, Active Component, U.S. Armed Forces 1998–2013,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report 21, no.
10 (October 2014): 21.
2. US Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), The National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015
(Washington, DC: JCS, June 2015), 14–15. The unclassified summary of the 2018 National Military
Strategy does not refer to suicide prevention.
3. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016
Annual Report, no. 0-A2345E0 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, June 20, 2018), iv.
4. James Griffith and Craig J. Bryan, “Preventing Suicides in the U.S. Military,” Psychological
Services 15, no. 3 (2018): 251.
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report, “suicide among troops spiked [to] crisis proportions.”5 Analysis
of data, however, shows the suicide rate for the Army has not significantly
changed since 2011.6 Indeed, annual suicide rates per 100,000 personyears for the US Army of 29.8 (2019), 29.9 (2018), 24.7 (2017), 27.4
(2016), 24.4 (2015), 24.6 (2014), 23.0 (2013), 29.6 (2012), and 24.8 (2011)
are within the same statistical margin of error.7 These data, which
contradict the typical narrative surrounding military suicide, warrant
the attention of leaders who may otherwise incorrectly interpret small
arithmetic changes in rates as significant.
Further, stable trends may take several years to establish and
interpret—quarterly or monthly reports inherently are prone to greater
uncertainty and instability of estimates. Defense Suicide Prevention
Office reports, collected monthly and issued to the public quarterly,
result in problematic statements such as “Army suicide deaths are up”
for a given reporting period.8 Such statements can be misinterpreted
by senior leaders as representing reliable trends and can, therefore,
misinform efforts to formulate a strategic approach to military suicide.
Similarly, literature on military suicide suggests rates across the
services nearly doubled from 10.1 per 100,000 in 2002 to 19.7 per
100,000 in 2009.9 But several intervening factors during this time period
call this interpretation into question. Prior to implementation of the
DoDSER in 2008, there were few systematic and standardized studies
of military suicides.10 Thus, rate calculations that include data prior to
the implementation of DoDSER differ depending on the case definition
utilized in a particular setting.11
5. Tom Vanden Brook, “Troops at Risk for Suicide Not Getting Needed Care, Report Finds,”
USA Today, August 7, 2017. Popular media might report a “20 percent spike” in military suicide
deaths in a given quarter. This number is a simple comparison of number of suicide events from a
given quarter compared to the previous quarter. This number does not account for normal variability
in the number of suicide deaths on a quarterly basis. If there were 71 suicide deaths in Quarter 2
of 2019, and 85 suicide deaths in Quarter 3 of 2019, then numerically this is a 20 percent increase.
But this comparison fails to report that any given quarter from 2017 through 2019 might have as
few as 57 suicide deaths, or as many as 99 suicide deaths. In that context, 85 suicide deaths is within
the typical range of quarterly suicide deaths over the previous three years and does not portray a
“spike” as reported in the media.
6. Jennifer Tucker, Derek J. Smolenski, and Carrie H. Kennedy, DoDSER: Calendar Year 2018
Annual Report, no. 4-B4E204C (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, July 2020), 12.
7. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year
2017 Annual Report, no. F-C3EE053 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency, July 2019), 18;
and Defense Suicide Prevention Office, Annual Suicide Report, Calendar Year 2019 (Washington, DC:
Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, October 2020), 12.
8. Rennie Vazquez, Department of Defense (DoD) Quarterly Suicide Report (QSR): 2nd Quarter, CY
2018 (Washington, DC: Defense Suicide Prevention Office, 2018), 3.
9. Joseph Logan et al., “Characteristics of Suicides among US Army Active Duty Personnel in
17 US States from 2005 to 2007,” American Journal of Public Health 102, Supplement 1 (March 2012):
S41; and Armed Forces Health Surveillance Branch, “Deaths by Suicide While on Active Duty,
Active and Reserve Components, U.S. Armed Forces, 1998–2011,” Medical Surveillance Monthly Report
19, no. 6 (June 2012): 8.
10. David S. C. Chu to Assistant Secretaries of the Military Departments for Manpower and
Reserve Affairs, memorandum, “Standardized DoD Suicide Data and Reporting,” June 2006, Under
Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, Washington, DC.
11. Kenneth L. Cox et al., “An Examination of Potential Misclassification of Army Suicides:
Results from the Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers,” Suicide and LifeThreatening Behavior 47, no. 3 (June 2017): 261.
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Reports prior to this time also relied primarily on medicolegal
determinations by the Armed Forces Medical Examiner System and may
have biased reporting toward accidents as a cause of death rather than
suicide.12 As a further complicating factor, policy changes during the
Obama administration ensured Servicemembers’ Group Life Insurance
would be paid to designated beneficiaries regardless of line-of-duty
determination for suicide deaths.13 Taken together, these biasing factors
make problematic any direct comparison of suicide rate data between
time periods before and after systematic data collection.

Suicide Rates

In contrast to the US Army suicide rate, which has remained
consistent since 2011, the suicide rate for the US population has
significantly increased.14 Recent statistics show suicide is now the tenth
leading cause of death and accounts for approximately 45,000 deaths
in the United States annually.15 Despite these facts, the most common
statement in the media is the military suicide rate is “well above the
national rate” for the US population.16
Similarly, the academic literature frequently cites the statistic that the
2008 Army suicide rate exceeded the crude rate of the US population.17
Due to demographic differences between the US population and the
subset of the population that serve on active duty in the US Army, a
direct comparison of crude or unadjusted suicide rates between the two
groups is inaccurate—the military is generally younger than the overall
US population and has a greater proportion of men.18 Thus any statistical
comparison between the two groups must be adjusted to be age- and
sex-matched.19 But no consensus has been reached or policy guidance
provided on which methods should be utilized when comparing rates—
for example, direct versus indirect standardization.20
An analysis of US Army suicide data from 2004 to 2015 using direct
standardization to match age and sex to the US population showed
12. Joel R. Carr, Charles W. Hoge, and Robert Potter, “Suicide Surveillance in the U.S. Military—
Reporting and Classification Biases in Rate Calculations,” Suicide and Life-Threatening Behavior 34, no.
3 (Fall 2004): 233–41.
13. Cox et al., “Examination of Potential Misclassification,” 261.
14. Deborah M. Stone et al., “Vital Signs: Trends in State Suicide Rates—United States, 1999–
2016 and Circumstances Contributing to Suicide—27 States, 2015,” Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 67, no. 22 (June 8, 2018): 617–24.
15. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “Web-Based Injury Statistics Query and
Reporting System: Leading Causes of Death Reports 1981–2016,” Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, accessed November 28, 2018.
16. Gregg Zoroya, “U.S. Military Suicides Remain High for 7th Year,” USA Today, updated May
4, 2016, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/04/01/us-military-suicides-remain
-stubbornly-high/82518278/.
17. Griffith and Bryan, “Preventing Suicides,” 251.
18. Larry D. Pruitt et al., “Suicide in the Military: Understanding Rates and Risk Factors across
the United States’ Armed Forces,” Military Medicine 184, no. 3/4, Supplement 1 (2019): 432–37; and
Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 21.
19. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 22.
20. Eren Youmans Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates in a Military Population: Methods to
Determine the Appropriate Standard Population,” American Journal of Public Health 108, no. 6 (June
1, 2018): 770.
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the US Army rate was below the comparable civilian rate for 8 of the
12 years included in the data.21 The annual DoDSER utilizes indirect
standardization to make similar comparisons of suicide rates between
the two groups in order to account better for age differences.22 These
data show the age- and sex-adjusted suicide rates in the US Army did
not significantly differ from the rates for the US population for calendar
years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017.
For three reporting years—calendar years 2011, 2012, and 2016—
the adjusted US Army suicide rates were slightly higher than the US
population rates.23 The magnitude of difference between the rates may
also be of importance when considering these exception years. When
comparing the calendar year 2012 data—the year in which crude rates
for the Army differ most from the civilian population—there is only a
one-hundredth of 1 percent difference between the two rates.24 These
findings cast doubt on reports suggesting suicides in the US Army
significantly exceed those for the US population.

Predictive Models

Models purporting to identify suicide deaths accurately are unlikely
to show sufficient predictive power to be useful for developing suicide
prevention programs. As the number of identified potential risk factors
for suicide increases and these factors are better measured, the number
of false positives will statistically increase due to the poor specificity of
predictors.25 In fact, the likely upper limit of positive predictive power
(the likelihood that an identified “positive” case will actually engage in
suicide behavior) for suicide assessment instruments is 78 percent based
on simulation studies among civilian psychiatric patients with a history of
self-inflicted injury.26
Thus even in the best identified statistical scenarios in high-risk
populations, false positives on validated screening measures will occur
22 percent of the time. In civilian settings, a false positive prompting
additional psychiatric evaluation may be considered a minor cost
compared to potentially lifesaving intervention.27 But in the Army
context, a false positive identification of suicide risk may inappropriately
preclude assignment to certain missions such as recruiting duty, flight
status, or assignments requiring a security clearance. These stigmaincreasing outcomes are in addition to the cost of the evaluation and the
opportunity cost of lost training associated with unneeded, additional
21. Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates,” 771.
22. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 13.
23. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2017, 33.
24. Watkins et al., “Adjusting Suicide Rates,” 776.
25. Joseph C. Franklin et al., “Risk Factors for Suicidal Thoughts and Behaviors: A MetaAnalysis of 50 Years of Research,” Psychological Bulletin 143, no. 2 (2017): 188.
26. Bradley E. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide Attempts and Deaths: A Systematic
Review and Simulation,” JAMA Psychiatry 76, no. 6 (2019): 646.
27. Peter Denchev et al., “Modeling the Cost-Effectiveness of Interventions to Reduce Suicide
Risk among Hospital Emergency Department Patients,” Psychiatric Services 69, no. 1 (January 2018): 23.
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assessments.28 Furthermore, false negatives may provide a false sense of
security for commanders and clinicians who assume a particular soldier
is not at risk.29
The relatively low base rate of suicides also prevents adequate
verification or cross-validation of predictive models. In order to
appropriately develop predictive models, the base rate in an initial
sample should be approximately 50 percent.30 Problems with predictive
models are further exacerbated when trying to expand predictive
models to groups with fewer risk factors or lower rates. Considering only
crude rates, the 2016 US Army suicide rate was 27.4 per 100,000, but
patients with a history of inpatient psychiatric admission have an average
suicide rate of 646 per 100,000.31 This difference in base rates makes the
use of previously validated scales for any prediction problematic.32
The false positive problem is pervasive across studies of
servicemembers and veterans and limits the utility of most clinical
risk assessment techniques.33 Even the Army Study to Assess Risk and
Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS), the large longitudinal
study of prospective suicide risk, showed an overwhelming number
of false positives—96.3 percent—when attempting to model
high-risk prediction.34
The US Army has recently adopted the Columbia-Suicide Severity
Rating Scale (C-SSRS) as a primary suicide risk assessment measure.35 The
C-SSRS is a mandatory suicide risk screening used in a variety of Army
medical settings including emergency departments, inpatient psychiatric
facilities, and outpatient clinics.36 Nonetheless, the designation of this
measure by the Defense Suicide Prevention Office and other civilian
hospital settings as the gold standard for suicide risk assessment may
communicate a false sense of assurance.37 Screening samples from the
C-SSRS indicate only 8 percent of the individuals who go on to engage
28. AC Davis, “How Classroom Training is Hindering Army Readiness,” Task & Purpose,
January 20, 2016.
29. Jacinta Hawgood and Diego De Leo, “Suicide Prediction—A Shift in Paradigm Is Needed,”
Crisis 37, no. 4 (2016): 252.
30. Takaya Saito and Marc Rehmsmeier, “The Precision-Recall Plot Is More Informative than
the ROC Plot When Evaluating Binary Classifiers on Imbalanced Datasets,” PLoS ONE 10, no. 3
(2015): e0118432, 3.
31. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 24; and Matthew Michael Large and Nav Kapur,
“Psychiatric Hospitalisation and the Risk of Suicide,” British Journal of Psychiatry 212, no. 5 (May
2018): 269.
32. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide,” 646.
33. Heidi D. Nelson, et al., “Suicide Risk Assessment and Prevention: A Systematic Review
Focusing on Veterans,” Psychiatric Services 68, no. 10 (October 2017): 1003–15.
34. Olav Nielssen, Duncan Wallace, and Matthew Large, “Pokorny’s Complaint: The Insoluble
Problem of the Overwhelming Number of False Positives Generated by Suicide Risk Assessment,”
BJPsych Bulletin 41, no. 1 (February 2017): 18–20.
35. US Army Medical Command (MEDCOM), Behavioral Health At-Risk Management Policy,
MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096 (Fort Sam Houston, TX: MEDCOM, 2016), 8.
36. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
37. Tim Hoyt and Diana M. Repke, “Development and Implementation of U.S. Army
Guidelines for Managing Soldiers at Risk of Suicide,” Military Medicine 184, no. 3/4, Supplement 1
(November–December 2019): 428.
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in suicide behaviors would be identified by this screening, and 4 percent
of individuals would be identified as false positives.38
Other studies using this assessment measure have shown similar
findings, namely, the potential for classification errors and missed cases
of suicide attempts.39 Thus, leaders receiving risk recommendations
from sources utilizing the C-SSRS must know the likelihood of
false positives and false negatives. Moreover, more recent techniques
(such as machine learning and predictive modeling) do not overcome
the inherent weaknesses caused by a low base rate event and poor
predictive power.40

Role of Leaders

For the reasons discussed, identifying risk factors through mass
screening may be of little utility in predicting the acute suicide risk of
an individual soldier.41 In contrast, leaders should focus on the core
drivers of suicide—stressors an individual associates with suicidality,
which may acutely increase suicide risk.42 For example, at the individual
soldier level, financial problems such as loss of pay due to misconduct or
reduction in rank could be a significant driver.43
In one of the few direct comparison studies of potential drivers
for suicide death among soldiers, researchers compared groups of
soldiers who died by suicide, and those who attempted suicide but did
not die, with demographically matched control soldiers.44 The study
identified that soldiers who exhibited suicide behaviors (both suicide
deaths and nonfatal suicide attempts) had greater odds of experiencing
legal and substance-abuse problems and failed intimate relationships
in the 90 days preceding the incident, with legal problems the most
significant differentiator of those servicemembers who died by suicide.45
Occupational problems such as nonselection for promotion or poor
performance evaluations were significantly associated with nonfatal
suicide attempts.46

38. John H. Greist et al., “Predictive Value of Baseline Electronic Columbia-Suicide Severity
Rating Scale (eC-SSRS) Assessments for Identifying Risk of Prospective Reports of Suicidal
Behavior during Research Participation,” Innovations in Clinical Neuroscience 11, no. 9–10 (September–
October 2014): 26.
39. Kelly L. Zuromski et al., “Assessment of a Risk Index for Suicide Attempts among US
Army Soldiers with Suicide Ideation: Analysis of Data from the Army Study to Assess Risk and
Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS),” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 3 (2019): e190766.
40. Belsher et al., “Prediction Models for Suicide,” 642–51.
41. John Sommers-Flanagan and Sidney L. Shaw, “Suicide Risk Assessment: What Psychologists
Should Know,” Professional Psychology: Research and Practice 48, no. 2 (2017): 99.
42. Raymond P. Tucker et al., “Risk Factors, Warning Signs, and Drivers of Suicide: What Are
They, How Do They Differ, and Why Does It Matter?” Suicide & Life-Threatening Behavior 45, no. 6
(2015): 681.
43. Caitlin A. Goodin et al., “Financial Hardship and Risk of Suicide among U.S. Army
Personnel,” Psychological Services 16, no. 2 (May 2019): 287.
44. Nancy A. Skopp et al., “Risk Factors for Self-Directed Violence in US Soldiers: A CaseControl Study,” Psychiatry Research 245 (November 2016): 196–97.
45. Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”
46. Skopp et al., “Case-Control Study.”
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These drivers of suicide behavior—financial, legal, relationship,
substance-abuse, and occupational problems—are not novel, but each
issue provides leaders with a potential opportunity to mitigate emerging
risk.47 As soon as the financial or legal problems of a soldier are identified,
leaders can ensure protected time during duty hours for soldiers to
resolve these issues before they become drivers of suicide behavior.
Also, leaders can assign unit mentors to check in regularly with soldiers
facing relationship or occupational problems to ensure these stressors
have not overwhelmed them.
Commanders can also take steps to decrease risk when soldiers
experience an acute driver of suicide. Throughout the past decade,
personally owned firearms are the leading mechanism of injury in
military suicides, accounting for 68.7 percent of all calendar year 2017
suicide deaths in the US Army.48 This statistic is complicated by recent
findings that only one-third of servicemembers store personal firearms
in their homes in a safe manner—locked and unloaded. Servicemembers
reporting recent thoughts of suicide were significantly less likely to
follow safe storage practices.49
Restriction of firearms has been shown to reduce the risk of some
suicides, but significant cultural and readiness barriers impede such
restrictions for soldiers experiencing stressful life events (that may or
may not become drivers for suicide).50 Still, commanders can mitigate
this risk by emphasizing safe storage practices for personally owned
firearms and by offering (rather than directing) temporary storage of
these firearms in unit arms rooms when soldiers experience potential
drivers of suicidal behavior.51 These actions can decrease the likelihood
a soldier will act impulsively during a moment of crisis, as any delay
allows more opportunity for the soldier to seek help.52

Prevention and Treatment Programs
Outside the Clinic
The Army has invested significant time and resources on suicide
prevention programs provided outside behavioral health clinics. As such,
these programs should be evaluated for efficacy in preventing suicide
deaths. Until May 2018, mandatory suicide prevention training was
conducted using the Ask, Care, and Escort program, and gatekeepers—
commanders, medical personnel, and chaplains—additionally received

47. Tim Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool for Assessing and Mitigating Suicide Risk
Factors,” Military Medicine 185, Supplement 1 (January-February 2020).
48. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2017, 74.
49. Craig J. Bryan et al., “Firearm Availability and Storage Practices among Military Personnel
Who Have Thought about Suicide,” JAMA Network Open 2, no. 8 (2019): e199160.
50. Tim Hoyt and Vicki Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction for Preventing U.S. Army
Suicide,” Military Psychology 27, no. 6 (2015): 386.
51. Department of Defense (DoD), Defense Suicide Prevention Program, DoD Instruction (DoDI)
6490.16 (Washington, DC: DoD, November 2017), 19.
52. Hoyt and Duffy, “Implementing Firearms Restriction,” 386.
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Applied Suicide Intervention Skills Training (ASIST).53 (The requirement
for mandatory suicide prevention training was eliminated in May 2018,
replaced with command discretion regarding such training.)54
Despite these training requirements, none of these intervention
programs have been systematically evaluated in military settings, and
there is minimal evidence regarding their effectiveness.55 The evidence
base is limited to several small-scale studies related to the facilitation
of suicide prevention training. One study evaluated the use of ASIST
in a small reserve unit sample and found the training was minimally
effective in reducing hopelessness among participants.56
Another study showed over 90 percent of Army chaplains and
chaplain assistants had received mandatory gatekeeper suicide prevention
training—ASIST—over the course of a year, and these gatekeepers
reported greater efficacy in responding to suicide risk among soldiers
than noncommissioned officers with similar gatekeeper training.57 A
study of noncommissioned officers showed they had a greater ability
to intervene than trained civilians in similar settings, such as resident
advisers receiving gatekeeper training in university residence halls.58
These same noncommissioned officers, however, indicated more
reluctance to intervene than gatekeepers in university settings due to
the perception they would be blamed for the death of an at-risk soldier,
or that their intervention could have deleterious effects on the soldier’s
career.59 These findings notwithstanding, there is no evidence gatekeeper
training has a direct effect on suicide rates.60 Thus the implementation of
gatekeeper training in the US Army should be clear regarding intended
outcomes: whereas the training may increase knowledge, it may not
necessarily increase likelihood of intervention and cannot be assumed
to reduce suicide deaths.

Clinical Treatment Settings
The treatment of suicidality in US Army clinical settings generally
focuses on soldiers experiencing acute or chronic suicidal ideation, plans,
or intent.61 This focus can limit the applicable scope of these activities
53. Headquarters, Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Health Promotion, Army Regulation
(AR) 600-63 (Washington, DC: HQDA, April 2015), 20–21.
54. Mark Esper, Prioritizing Efforts—Readiness and Lethality Update 7 (Washington, DC: Secretary
of the Army, May 25, 2018).
55. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives on Identifying, Caring
For, and Referring Soldiers and Marines at Risk of Suicide,” Psychiatric Services 66, no. 10 (October
2015): 1057.
56. Alexa Smith-Osborne, Arati Maleku, and Sarolyn Morgan, “Impact of Applied Suicide
Intervention Skills Training on Resilience and Suicide Risk in Army Reserve Units,” Traumatology 23,
no. 1 (2017): 49–55.
57. Rajeev Ramchand et al., “Army Chaplains’ Perceptions about Identifying, Intervening, and
Referring Soldiers at Risk of Suicide,” Spirituality in Clinical Practice 2, no. 1 (March 2015): 36–47.
58. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1061.
59. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.
60. Crystal Burnette, Rajeev Ramchand, and Lynsay Ayer, “Gatekeeper Training for Suicide
Prevention: A Theoretical Model and Review of the Empirical Literature,” RAND Health Quarterly
5, no. 1 (2015): 16.
61. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096.
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for the Army since less than half of soldiers that died by suicide between
2004 and 2009 had sought behavioral health care.62 Notwithstanding
this limitation, several interventions have shown empirical support in
reducing suicide behavior in clinical settings.63
Several former military officers developed a type of brief cognitive
behavioral therapy to address suicide behavior among soldiers who
had been treated for suicidality in an inpatient psychiatric facility.64
Soldiers who received this intervention in addition to the usual standard
of care showed significantly lower rates of suicide attempts over the
two years following treatment compared to soldiers receiving the usual
treatment.65 A core component of this military-specific intervention is
the development of an individualized safety or crisis response plan for
each soldier.66
These safety plans are developed collaboratively and individually
with each soldier, often in consultation with command, and identify
coping strategies and sources of support that have proven effective in
reducing distress.67 The implementation of safety and crisis response
plans are not the sole purview of treating clinicians. Army policy requires
a safety plan for any soldier identified with any significant suicide risk
in behavioral health care and encourages working collaboratively with
command to ensure safety plans do not overly limit a soldier’s gainful
employment in the unit.68 The overall goal of a safety or crisis response
plan is to ensure the soldier has a tangible, concrete plan of action when
facing a distressing situation.69
A similar approach—the Collaborative Assessment and
Management of Suicidality (CAMS)—also has shown promise in
the scientific literature, including with military populations.70 This
integrative treatment emphasizes a problem-focused approach,
developing a treatment plan that reduces the underlying hopelessness
and stress that drive suicide behavior.71 Clinical trials have shown
the CAMS approach can significantly reduce suicidal ideation in
62. Ronald C. Kessler et al., “Predicting Suicides after Outpatient Mental Health Visits in the
Army Study to Assess Risk and Resilience in Servicemembers (Army STARRS),” Molecular Psychiatry
22, no. 4 (April 2017): 544–51.
63. Esther L. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect Psychosocial and Behavioural Interventions
to Prevent Suicide and Suicide Attempts: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” Lancet Psychiatry
3, no. 6 (June 2016): 544–54.
64. M. David Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects on Post-Treatment
Suicide Attempts in a Military Sample: Results of a Randomized Clinical Trial with 2-Year FollowUp,” American Journal of Psychiatry 172, no. 5 (May 2015): 441–49.
65. Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects,” 445.
66. Rudd et al., “Brief Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy Effects,” 444.
67. Craig J. Bryan et al., “Effect of Crisis Response Planning vs. Contracts for Safety on Suicide
Risk in U.S. Army Soldiers: A Randomized Clinical Trial,” Journal of Affective Disorders 212 (April
2017): 64–72.
68. MEDCOM, MEDCOM Policy Memo 16-096, 5.
69. Bryan et al., “Effect of Crisis Response Planning,” 67.
70. David A. Jobes, Rene Lento, and Katherine Brazaitis, “An Evidence-Based Clinical
Approach to Suicide Prevention in the Department of Defense: The Collaborative Assessment and
Management of Suicidality, (CAMS),” Military Psychology 24 (2012): 607.
71. Jobes, Lento, and Brazaitis, “An Evidence-Based Clinical Approach,” 606.
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soldiers and reduce emergency department visits related to suicide and
psychiatric hospitalization.72
Despite these findings, military clinicians have been slow to adopt
these collaborative approaches and similar empirically supported
clinical techniques.73 Strategic leaders must emphasize training in
these modalities to reduce the impact of suicide behavior on readiness.
Population-wide meta-analysis indicates the most powerful strategies for
suicide prevention (for example, gatekeeper training and psychosocial
treatment) each could account for up to a 7 percent reduction in suicide
deaths.74 These tailored treatments are more effective than broad
treatments that include suicide behavior as a secondary treatment target.75
Indeed, former Air Force officer and leading military suicide
researcher Dr. Craig Bryan indicates it is unlikely new treatments are
needed to address the current rates of suicide in the Army, and “the next
step in suicide prevention should be to adapt and refine what already
works to make [treatment] work even better.” 76 But meta-analysis also
suggests these treatments may be most effective for up to three months
following cessation of treatment.77 Leaders cannot, therefore, assume a
soldier’s risk of suicide has been resolved simply because the soldier has
successfully terminated treatment and is no longer required to be on a
duty-limiting profile.78

Suicide Reduction

Zero suicides have been the stated goal of many suicide reduction
initiatives during the past two decades.79 Since suicide rates in the
US Army have not significantly changed since 2011, it may be more
reasonable to focus on a strategic target for reduction supported by
the empirical literature. As discussed, small year-to-year changes in
the suicide rate should not be interpreted as a significant increase or
decrease unless backed by statistical analysis that demonstrates an index
of reliable change. For example, when comparing the suicide rate for
2016 against the average rate for the previous three-year period, in
order to reliably identify a statistical decrease in the US Army suicide
rate, the total number of suicide deaths would need to be reduced from

72. David A. Jobes et al., “A Randomized Controlled Trial of the Collaborative Assessment
and Management of Suicidality versus Enhanced Care as Usual with Suicidal Soldiers,” Psychiatry:
Interpersonal & Biological Processes 80, no. 4 (2017): 339–56.
73. David A. Jobes, “Clinical Assessment and Treatment of Suicidal Risk: A Critique of
Contemporary Care and CAMS as a Possible Remedy,” Practice Innovations 2, no. 4 (2017): 212.
74. Helen Christensen, Pim Cuijpers, and Charles F. Reynolds III, “Changing the Direction of
Suicide Prevention Research: A Necessity for True Population Impact,” JAMA Psychiatry 73, no. 5
(May 2016): 435–36.
75. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect,” 550.
76. Craig J. Bryan, “Adjusting Our Aim: Next Steps in Military and Veteran Suicide Prevention,”
Spirituality in Clinical Practice 2, no. 1 (2015): 84–85.
77. Meerwijk et al., “Direct versus Indirect,” 550.
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79. David W. Covington and Michael F. Hogan, “Zero Suicide: The Dogged Pursuit of
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127 (2016) to 92 (in a future year) assuming an equivalent military end
strength for that year.80
To put this difference in context, a reliable 28 percent decrease
would be required; this decrease would be equivalent to comparing
the highest recent count of 164 suicides in 2012 to the lowest recent
count of 120 suicides in 2015 (a 27 percent change).81 This reduction
target should be considered in the context of the overall literature
on suicide prevention techniques. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis on
reducing the population suicide rate detailed a statistical model that
combined all current, evidence-based suicide prevention strategies
into a single, integrated strategy.82 If implemented with perfect fidelity,
these data suggest a multiyear strategy hypothetically could reach a
25 percent reduction.

Recommendations

In summary, the data on US Army suicides differs from the typical
narrative in popular media: the rate of soldier suicide does not differ
from the general US population and has been at a steady state since
2011.83 This steady state indicates Army-wide interventions to decrease
suicide have been ineffective at reducing the suicide rate despite the
lack of specific studies evaluating the impact of prevention efforts. It is
possible the comparison of trends between the US population suicide
rate, which has increased over the past decade, and the US Army suicide
rate, which remains steady, could be interpreted as US Army efforts
being successful in preventing a corresponding increase.
But due to the very low base suicide rate in the Army, the relatively
small population of soldiers compared to the general population, and
year-to-year measurement error over a relatively short period, the most
likely interpretation of this data is in line with more robust research
findings that the US population suicide rate does not differ from the
US Army suicide rate. Leaders must strive to understand that current
suicide rates in the United States are not unique to the military and are
occurring as part of broader societal trends. In pursuit of this goal, the
authors offer four recommendations.

Research
First, despite demands for increasingly immediate data, any suicide
rate calculations should focus on annual numbers, not quarterly
reporting, and trends should only be interpreted based on multiyear
comparisons rather than year-to-year variation. As the US Army seeks to
eliminate suicide, interim targets for significant decreases should be set.

80. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, 31.
81. Larry D. Pruitt et al., Department of Defense Suicide Event Report (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2015
Annual Report, no. E-6A4ED71 (Washington, DC: Defense Health Agency), 17.
82. Christensen, Cuijpers, and Reynolds, “Changing the Direction,” 435–36.
83. Pruitt et al., (DoDSER): Calendar Year 2016, iv.
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Second, prevention efforts must be validated before widespread
implementation. Whereas unit-wide suicide prevention training
programs have raised awareness during the past two decades, none have
been shown to reduce suicide behavior or suicide deaths.84 Additional
prevention programs should not be emphasized; instead, research should
be dedicated to clear demonstrations of program efficacy and adherence
to implementation science practice.

Prevention
Third, the Army must continue to address the drivers for suicide
at the individual level. The recent elimination of mandatory suicide
prevention training requirements at the unit level provides leaders with
an opportunity to focus on risk mitigation among those soldiers facing
the greatest occupational, interpersonal, and social risks. Emerging tools
to assist leaders in addressing suicide concerns among servicemembers
similarly focus on a one-on-one assessment that mitigates risk at the
individual level.85 Like airmen in the Air Force Limited Privilege
Suicide Prevention program, soldiers facing investigations or other
legal problems should be allowed to seek behavioral health support
during crises without this information becoming admissible as part
of the medical record or adversely affecting the soldier during legal or
administrative proceedings.86
Furthermore, formal unit-level mentoring programs for soldiers
facing divorce or occupational problems can ensure individuals are aware
of support options such as legal, financial, and housing assistance.87 The
Army should mandate empirically supported treatment techniques in
clinical settings with an emphasis on individualized safety planning
that involves collaboration between the servicemember, the chain of
command, and treatment providers.88
Fourth, the US Army must become a learning organization in its
approach to suicide prevention. The effectiveness of some prevention
efforts during the past decade may have been hampered by frontline
leaders assuming they would be held responsible if they intervened and
the soldier subsequently died by suicide.89 Commanders at all levels
cannot abdicate responsibility for suicide deaths in their formations, but
their accountability must remain within the bounds of their control.
Commanders’ critical incident reporting and fatality review boards can
focus on best practices to mitigate risk associated with known drivers
of suicide behavior.
Additionally, professional military education programs should set
aside time for seminar discussions about frontline approaches to suicide
84. Burnette, Ramchand, and Ayer, “Gatekeepers Training for Suicide Prevention,” 16.
85. Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
86. Department of the Air Force, Medical Operations: Mental Health, Air Force Instruction 44-172
(Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 2015), 39.
87. Hoyt et al., “Development of a Leader Tool.”
88. Hoyt and Repke, “Managing Soldiers at Risk,” 429.
89. Ramchand et al., “Noncommissioned Officers’ Perspectives,” 1059.
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risk mitigation. It is the authors’ experience that all senior leaders have
direct familiarity with individual cases of suicide behavior in their
formations. Leaders must share the successes and failures of frontline
approaches to risk mitigation in order to disseminate best practices and
drive innovative approaches. By addressing these areas through a culture
of learning, strategic leaders may be able to facilitate a reliable decrease
in the number of suicide deaths in the US Army.
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